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Abstract:  Roughly, psychological egoism is the thesis that all of a person's 
intentional actions are ultimately self-interested in some sense; psychological 
altruism is the thesis that some people's intentional actions are ultimately other-
regarding in some sense.  C. Daniel Batson and other social psychologists have 
argued that there are experiments that provide support for a theory called the 
―empathy-altruism hypothesis,‖ which entails the falsity of psychological egoism.  
However, several critics claim that there are egoistic explanations of the data that are 
still not ruled out.  One of the most potent criticisms of Batson comes from Elliott 
Sober and David Sloan Wilson.  I argue for two main theses in this paper:  (1) we can 
improve on Sober and Wilson‘s conception of psychological egoism and altruism, 
and (2) this improvement shows that one of the strongest of Sober and Wilson‘s 
purportedly egoistic explanations is not tenable.  A defense of these two theses goes 
some way toward defending Batson‘s claim that the evidence from social psychology 




It‘s uncontroversial that some people sometimes help others.  So, one can hardly 
deny that there are what one might call ―helpful actions.‖  But one can still help 
another without being altruistic.  One could have an ulterior motive:  one‘s ultimate 
goal could be to benefit oneself, not the other person.  Thus, we wonder:  When 
someone helps another person, is it always ultimately motivated by self-interest?  
Fairly recently there has been a resurgence of interest in this psychological egoism-
altruism debate.  There are two opposing positions on the issue.  Roughly, 
psychological egoists claim that all of a person‘s intentional actions are ultimately 
self-interested or selfish in some sense; psychological altruists claim that some 
people‘s intentional actions are not ultimately self-interested, since some are 
ultimately other-regarding.   
The (psychological) egoism-altruism debate is a difficult one to settle.  
Consider a hypothetical case.  Suppose Omar helps Kima, a complete stranger, by 
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informing her that the floor is slippery up ahead.  Was the ultimate motivation for 
Omar‘s action simply to help Kima, or was it to achieve some benefit for himself?  
The psychological egoist claims that Omar‘s ultimate motivation is really self-
serving; he helped only to achieve some self-interested goal.  Perhaps his ultimate 
goal was to avoid the feelings of guilt that would surely follow if he didn‘t tell her 
about the slippery floor and she fell and hurt herself as a result.  Or perhaps his 
ultimate goal was to gain a good feeling that he figured he could gain by helping her 
out.  On the other hand, the psychological altruist claims that at least sometimes the 
ultimate motivation for performing such actions is not for one‘s own benefit.  On this 
view, we needn‘t assume that Omar‘s ultimate motive was self-interested; it‘s at least 
psychologically possible for his ultimate goal to be to help Kima, a goal that is not 
just a means to helping himself in some way.  
Over the past several decades much attention has been drawn in various fields 
to experimental research in social psychology that has been conducted on this issue.  
The key figure, C. Daniel Batson, argues that the data from the experiments provide 
sufficient evidence against psychological egoism by supporting an anti-egoistic 
theory called the ―empathy-altruism hypothesis.‖  However, several critics—
including philosophers, psychologists, and biologists—have argued that Batson‘s 
conclusions are not justified.  Two prime critics are Elliott Sober and David Sloan 
Wilson, who argue in their book Unto Others (1998) that there are egoistic 
alternatives that can equally explain the data.  While Sober and Wilson do ultimately 
argue that psychological egoism is false, they think evolutionary theory provides the 
evidence for this, not traditional philosophical arguments or the psychological 
arguments based on the empirical evidence.   
I have two main theses I want to defend in this paper.  First, Sober and 
Wilson‘s conception of the egoism-altruism debate is not quite correct.  Second, 
improving on the conception of the debate shows that one of Sober and Wilson‘s 
purportedly egoistic explanations of the data does not support psychological egoism.  
A defense of these two theses goes some way toward defending Batson‘s claim that 
the evidence from social psychology provides sufficient reason to reject 
psychological egoism.  I begin (in §2) by summarizing the conceptual framework for 
the egoism-altruism debate that has been developed primarily by Sober and Wilson.  
In defense of my first thesis, I subsequently argue (in §3) that we must incorporate 
what I call ―relational desires‖ and ―essential beneficiaries‖ into the debate.  I then 
turn to defending my second thesis.  To this end, I review the relevant experiments 
(in §4) and Sober and Wilson‘s criticisms of the argument that Batson bases on them 
(in §5).  Equipped with the improved conception of the debate, I show that Sober and 
Wilson‘s supposedly egoistic explanation of the data—what I will call the ―modified 
negative-state relief hypothesis‖—is incompatible with psychological egoism.  
 
2.  A Conceptual Framework for Egoism and Altruism 
 
In order to understand the claims of the psychological egoist versus those of the 
psychological altruist, some conceptual groundwork must be laid.  Pre-theoretically, 
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a person acts altruistically if she acts with an irreducible concern for the welfare of 
another.  Thus, the ordinary concept of altruism applies to actions.  But whether a 
given action is altruistic depends on whether one performs the action with a certain 
goal—namely of benefiting another—that is not reducible or instrumental to any 
other goal.  Thus, as Batson and Sober and Wilson make clear, altruism is 
fundamentally a property of the motive, goal, or motivational state that underlies the 
action.  Furthermore, following Thomas Nagel (1970), they recognize that, while we 
ordinarily only apply the term ―altruism‖ and its cognates to especially heroic or self-
sacrificing acts that are fairly atypical, the egoism-altruism debate concerns the 
underlying motives of all helpful actions.  
With these basic constraints in mind, Sober and Wilson (1998) define 
psychological egoism as the view that ―people desire their own well-being, and 
nothing else, as an end in itself‖ (p. 224).  They then define psychological altruism 
as the view that ―people sometimes care about the welfare of others as an end in 
itself‖ (p. 228).  However, to make their characterizations more precise, they 
introduce the terms ―self-directed‖ and ―other-directed.‖  They then define the theses 
in these terms.  They state that psychological egoism ―maintains that the only 
ultimate goals an individual has are self-directed‖ (p. 224) while psychological 
altruism maintains that ―we [sometimes] have other-directed ultimate desires‖ (p. 
229).   
While Sober and Wilson focus on defining the positions on the debate, Batson 
(1991) focuses on defining the motivational states at issue.  He writes that egoism ―is 
a motivational state with the ultimate goal of increasing one‘s own welfare‖ (p. 7) 
while altruism ―is a motivational state with the ultimate goal of increasing another‘s 
welfare‖ (p. 6).  Presumably Batson would agree that the thesis of psychological 
egoism is that all motivational states are a form of what he calls ―egoism‖ and the 
thesis of psychological altruism is that there are some motivational states that are a 
form of what he calls ―altruism.‖  My main concern is which thesis is true, but it will 
be easiest and most natural to provide non-substantive definitions of the theses in 
terms of the states and give substance to these definitions by providing a substantive 
characterization of the relevant states that figure in the theses.  However, to avoid 
confusing the theses with the types of state, I will depart from Batson‘s terminology 
here and say that a motivational state is ―egoistic‖ or ―altruistic.‖  I will work with 
the following non-substantive definitions of the theses, which should be 
uncontroversial:   
Psychological Egoism:  All of a person‘s ultimate desires are egoistic. 




                                                 
1
 Even though it is the motivational state that ultimately determines whether a person‘s action is 
altruistic, one might think that only a motivational state that does in fact move one to act is either a 
form of altruism or not. (Consider someone who has an altruistic motive and an egoistic motive, but 
acts on the egoistic motive.  Was there at all an instance of altruism in that case?  Perhaps not.)  If this 
is so, then we can alter the relevant definitions accordingly.  Such modifications won‘t affect any of 
the arguments in this paper. 
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Substance will be added to these definitions by characterizing what it is to be an 
egoistic or altruistic desire.   
But before that, there are a few things to note about using the term ―desire‖ here.  
The relevant mental item at issue in the egoism-altruism debate is what one might 
ordinarily call a ―motive,‖ ―goal,‖ or perhaps ―intention.‖  Many, however, use more 
technical terms.  Batson, for example, tends to use ―motivational state,‖ while Sober 
and Wilson (and many other philosophers) use the term ―desire.‖  I will, for the most 
part, follow Sober and Wilson in using the term ―desire,‖ primarily because it is a 
common term to use among contemporary philosophers and it allows for making 
explicit that the relevant mental items have content (by using such technical 
locutions as ―S desires that p‖).  However, the use of the term ―desire‖ in this debate 
should not be taken as a commitment to the so-called ―Humean theory of 
motivation.‖ We needn‘t take a stance on such issues.  For our purposes, we simply 
need mental states with certain features, such as motivating (at least in part) an agent 
to act, having intentional content, being goal-directed, and so on.  Throughout this 
paper I will use the term ―desire‖ to designate what is at issue in the egoism-altruism 
debate (namely, a motive, goal, etc. of an individual). 
So which desires are egoistic and which are altruistic?  While few have provided 
a precise answer to this question, Sober and Wilson do.  They do this by 
characterizing what it is to be an altruistic or egoistic desire in terms of self-directed 
and other-directed desires.  Roughly speaking, one‘s self-directed desires are those 
desires that only concern oneself, whereas one‘s other-directed desires are those 





S‘s desire that p is self-directed if and only if:  (a) p contains a representation 
of oneself as such, and (b) p does not contain a representation of someone as 
distinct from oneself. 
Other-Directed Desires 
S‘s desire that p is other-directed if and only if:  (a) p does not contain a 
representation of oneself as such, and (b) p contains a representation of 
someone as distinct from oneself. 
For example, Reginald‘s desire that his business partner, Sherad, learns arithmetic is 
other-directed, because the content of Reginald‘s desire contains a representation of 
someone and that someone is represented as distinct from himself.  But Reginald‘s 
desire to no longer be addicted to heroin (i.e. his desire that he is no longer addicted 
to heroin) is self-directed, since the content of his desire represents someone and that 
someone is represented as himself (i.e. represented first-personally).
3
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 These definitions are based on Sober and Wilson (1998, p. 225), though I have tried to make them 
more precise.  They have been greatly improved by discussions with Aaron Zimmerman. 
3
 On the importance of first-personal representations of oneself here, see Sober and Wilson (1998, p. 
214). 
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Notice that the above definitions take desires to be mental states with objects or 
contents.  Following Sober and Wilson, I will take beliefs and desires to have 
propositional content.  So, for example, Thomas‘s desire to eat some coffee ice 
cream is at least roughly equivalent to his desiring that he has some coffee ice cream, 
where the desire is in some sense satisfied when the relevant proposition (i.e. that he 
eats some coffee ice cream) is true.  As Sober and Wilson make clear, the sense of 
―satisfaction‖ here is not in the phenomenological sense of feeling satisfied.  Rather, 
it is in the sense of the desire being fulfilled—that is, the content of the desire being 
true.  We can follow Scanlon (1998, p. 41) in calling this the ―logical sense‖ of 
satisfaction or fulfillment.  
We must lastly include in an appropriate way the concept of one‘s well-being, 
benefit, or welfare.  As Sober and Wilson (1998, p. 229) point out, a person who has 
an ultimate desire for another‘s death is not altruistic, even though the content of the 
ultimate desire is other-directed.  Likewise, consider an ultimate desire to snap one‘s 
fingers from time to time (where the agent doesn‘t conceive of this as benefitting 
anyone).  Such desires are neither altruistic nor egoistic.  So, we must recognize that 
the psychological egoist claims that all of our ultimate desires concern one‘s own 
benefit while the psychological altruist claims that some of our ultimate desires 
concern the benefit of another.
4
   
We are now in a position to understand the two types of motivational state at 
issue, at least as far as Sober and Wilson are concerned.  Recall that psychological 
egoism is the thesis that all of one‘s ultimate desires are egoistic; psychological 
altruism is the thesis that some of one‘s ultimate desires are altruistic.  Sober and 
Wilson supply a way to add substance to our non-substantive definitions by 
providing an account of what makes a desire egoistic or altruistic.  Their account 
centers primarily on the distinction between self-directed and other-directed desires 
and the notion of a person‘s benefit: 
Egoistic Desires (v.1) 
S‘s desire that p is egoistic if and only if: (a) p concerns the benefit of 
some person, (b) S‘s desire is self-directed, and (c) S‘s desire is ultimate. 
Altruistic Desires (v. 1) 
S‘s desire that p is altruistic if and only if: (a) p concerns the benefit of 
some person, (b) S‘s desire is other-directed, and (c) S‘s desire is 
ultimate. 
 
I take these definitions of the relevant states combined with the relevant theses to 
accurately represent how Sober and Wilson, if not many others as well, characterize 
the egoism-altruism debate.  While I think these definitions are close to an accurate 
representation of the debate, there is a problem once we consider ultimate desires 
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 Sober and Wilson are not always careful on this point.  Sometimes they don‘t include the crucial 
notion of well-being in their definitions of psychological egoism and altruism.  For example, they 
sometimes simply say:  ―Egoism claims that all of our ultimate desires are self-directed; altruism, that 
some are other-directed‖ (2000a, p. 197).  See also their ―more precise‖ statements I quoted toward 
the beginning of this section. 
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with contents that contain representations of both oneself and another—what I will 
call ―relational desires.‖   
 
3.  Improving the Conception of the Debate  
 
3.1  Relational Desires 
Sober and Wilson (1998) recognize the issue of relational desires, calling them 
―desires that mention both self and other‖ (p. 225), but they refrain from construing 
psychological egoism or altruism as making any claims about them.  They contend 
that such a construal is ―difficult to justify‖ and may ―bias the case in favor of one 
position over the other‖ (p. 226).  They propose to simply admit a third view into the 
taxonomy, separate from both psychological egoism and psychological altruism, 
called relationism—―the view that people sometimes have ultimate desires that 
certain relational propositions (connecting self and specific others) be true‖ (p. 226).  
Fortunately, they invite anyone who ―thinks that some cases of relationism are 
properly viewed as subspecies of altruism or of egoism… to adjust the conceptual 
taxonomy‖ since their ―assessment of these theories will not be affected by such 
amendments‖ (p. 226).  I intend to make the case that we should adjust the 




Sober and Wilson (1998, pp. 225-6) in fact provide brief examples of ultimate 
relational desires, yet reject them too quickly as ultimately inessential to the debate.  
Building on one of their examples, consider the following case.   
Stolen Kiss 
Milhouse is enamored with Lisa.  He thinks about her constantly and 
finds himself ultimately desiring to kiss her.  (It‘s not that he just wants 
to feel good and thinks kissing her is a means to this ultimate end.  
Rather, he simply has the relevant ultimate desire.)  However, he 
doesn‘t at all care how Lisa feels about it.  He‘d like just to ―steal‖ a 
kiss from her.  One day he throws himself upon Lisa and kisses her 
promptly on the lips.  Lisa, who is shocked and a bit annoyed by the 
whole incident, pushes Milhouse away.  Though Lisa is rather upset, 
Milhouse is pleased; he got just what he wanted. 
Milhouse‘s ultimate desire will be satisfied only if he benefits from the kiss, but 
whether Lisa benefits is not one of the conditions required for the satisfaction of his 
desire—what one might call the ―satisfaction conditions‖ of the desire.6  Given that 
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 The idea that Sober and Wilson cannot remain neutral on whether certain relational desires are 
altruistic was brought to my attention by Aaron Zimmerman.  My discussion of this issue has been 
greatly aided by valuable discussions with him. 
6
 Stipulating that Milhouse‘s benefit is a satisfaction condition of his ultimate desire probably requires 
characterizing the propositional content of his desire in a more specific way, such as the following:  I 
have an enjoyable kiss with Lisa.  However, for convenience I often will spell these details out in the 
form of a more detailed description of what the satisfaction conditions of the desire in the case are, 
rather than in the form of a long and complicated proposition that constitutes the content of the desire.  
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Milhouse is ultimately concerned with his own benefit, not Lisa‘s, his desire—
though relational—should be classified as egoistic.  It‘s the kind of desire whose 
existence is perfectly compatible with the thesis of psychological egoism.  Such 
examples suggest that we must broaden our characterization of egoistic desires to 
capture certain relational desires.   
A similar case can be made that some relational ultimate desires are altruistic.  
Consider another scenario.   
Single Savior 
While driving, Nate sees a car veer off the road up ahead, hit a bump, 
and flip in the air.  As he pulls up to the scene, he sees that a young 
woman, Brenda, is trapped under the vehicle.  Without thinking, he 
immediately rushes to her aid, motivated by an ultimate desire to help 
her (i.e. an ultimate desire that he help her).  (He doesn‘t first ultimately 
desire that she is helped by someone or other and then form the 
instrumental desire that he help her because he sees that no one else is 
around to do it—others are around as well.  Rather, he is just 
immediately and ultimately motivated to run over and save her 
himself.)  In the end, Nate successfully helps Brenda out from under the 
car, and he is relieved. 
Although Nate‘s ultimate desire is clearly relational, I submit that it is altruistic.  
After all, Nate is not ultimately concerned with his own well-being at all; he‘s 
concerned with someone else‘s.  In other words, the well-being of someone else is a 
satisfaction condition for his ultimate desire.  That Nate is represented in the content 
of his own desire seems rather irrelevant to whether the desire is altruistic.  Thus, it 
is incorrect to claim that only other-directed ultimate desires are altruistic.   
Some relational desires, then, are egoistic and some are altruistic.  And this is 
what we should expect.  Sober and Wilson‘s characterization of such desires was in 
terms of who is represented in the contents of the agent‘s desire.  But who is 
represented is rather unimportant for whether the desire is selfish in the sense 
relevant to the egoism-altruism debate.  The significance of psychological egoism is 
that, if true, it yields that we‘re all ―deep down‖ out to benefit ourselves—that all of 
our ultimate desires concern our own personal gain.  Yet, on Sober and Wilson‘s 
characterization of the debate, psychological egoism wouldn‘t be true even if 
psychologists discovered that all our ultimate desires were relational yet selfish in 
the way Milhouse‘s desire to kiss Lisa is.  This is because they think such relational 
desires are neither egoistic nor altruistic.  Likewise, on Sober and Wilson‘s view, if 
it‘s possible to have ultimate relational desires like Nate‘s, then psychological 
egoism wouldn‘t be defeated—even though Nate‘s desire involves a non-
instrumental concern for Brenda‘s benefit.  This gets the debate wrong.   In order to 
get it right, we must broaden the definitions of both psychological egoism and 





3.2  Essential Beneficiaries 
Now, of course, the crucial question is:  Which relational desires are compatible with 
psychological egoism versus psychological altruism?  The answer is already 
becoming clear.  As we have seen, the claim that the contents of all of one‘s ultimate 
desires represent oneself as the person who benefits is crucial to psychological 
egoism.  That is, psychological egoism claims that we are always represented as 
what I will call an ―essential beneficiary‖ in the contents of our ultimate desires.  We 
can more technically define an essential beneficiary in the following way: 
Essential Beneficiary 
A subject S* is an essential beneficiary of S‘s desire that p if and only if:  
it is a necessary condition for the satisfaction of S‘s desire that S* 
benefits. 
One way, perhaps, to understand the notion of a satisfaction condition here is the 
following counterfactual:  if S were to believe that S* would not benefit from p‘s 
being true, then S would not desire that p.  However, we must be careful here.  One 
way to read this counterfactual (or the word ―necessary‖ in the definition provided) 
is such that the other‘s benefit is necessary but not somehow represented in the 
content of the agent‘s ultimate desire.  This, however, is not the intended reading.  
Suppose, for example, that Jimmy has an ultimate desire with the following content:  
I have an enjoyable kiss with Beatie.  But suppose that it just so happens that the 
only way for him to benefit, given the circumstances, is if she enjoys the kiss as well.  
On my account, Beatie is not an essential beneficiary, because Jimmy does not 
represent her benefit as essential, even though in some sense her benefit is essential 
to his.  So, someone is an essential beneficiary only if that person‘s benefit is 
represented as essential in the content of the agent‘s desire. 
Whether a desire is egoistic or altruistic seems to turn on whether the agent is 
represented as an essential beneficiary.  In Stolen Kiss, Milhouse‘s desire is clearly 
egoistic because he is the only essential beneficiary in the content of his ultimate 
desire.  And in Single Savior, Nate‘s ultimate desire is clearly altruistic because 
someone other than Nate himself is an essential beneficiary.  But what about cases in 
which both self and other are represented as essential beneficiaries?  Consider a third 
case: 
Tennis Game 
Liz is preparing to play a game of tennis with her friend, Tracy, and 
ultimately desires to have a mutually enjoyable game with him.  (Since 
her desire is ultimate, she doesn‘t want to have a mutually enjoyable 
game simply as a means to achieving good feelings or some other 
benefit.)  Throughout the game, her behavior is guided by her ultimate 
goal:  she tries to not embarrass her opponent with her superior skills 
but also to be challenging enough so that the game is enjoyable for 
them both.  They both have a good time, and Liz is pleased. 
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In this case, both the agent (Liz) and another (Tracy) are represented as essential 
beneficiaries.  Is such an ultimate desire egoistic?  I think not.  The benefit of 
someone other than the agent is represented as essential in this ultimate desire.  Since 
the existence of such a desire entails that someone can ultimately desire the welfare 
of another, it is incompatible with psychological egoism.  But is such a desire 
altruistic?  This is certainly a more difficult question to answer.  Since we are using 
―egoistic‖ and ―altruistic‖ as technical terms here, we cannot appeal to linguistic 
intuition.  We must consider whether such a desire is compatible with the thesis of 
psychological altruism at issue in the debate.  While I will assume that such desires 
are altruistic, for the purposes of this paper, we need only hold the weaker claim that 
they are not egoistic.
7
  We‘ll return to this issue later. 
Egoistic and altruistic desires can now be redefined in light of these 
considerations.  Roughly speaking, egoistic desires are ultimate desires in which 
oneself is represented as the only essential beneficiary; altruistic desires are ultimate 
desires in which another person is an essential beneficiary.  More technically: 
Egoistic Desires (v. 2) 
S‘s desire that p is egoistic if and only if: (a) S‘s desire is ultimate, (b) p 
contains a single essential beneficiary S*, and (c) S* is represented as S‘s 
self. 
Altruistic Desires (v. 2) 
S‘s desire that p is altruistic if and only if: (a) S‘s desire is ultimate, (b) p 
contains at least one essential beneficiary S*, and (c) S* is represented as 
distinct from S‘s self. 
This account of altruistic desires admittedly relies on the stronger claim that the 
desire in Tennis Game is altruistic.  However, for the second thesis of this paper, we 
only need an account of egoistic desires.  And the account I‘ve provided here only 
relies on the weaker claim that the desire in Tennis Game is not egoistic.  If the 
stronger claim is false, we can simply adjust the account of altruistic desires by 
adding the following clause (d):  S is not an essential beneficiary.  
This construal of the relevant states yields the correct judgments about all the 
sorts of cases we‘ve discussed.  It captures all the previous cases, because all self-
directed ultimate desires for the benefit of a person will be ones in which oneself is 
the only individual represented as an essential beneficiary; thus they are egoistic.  
Likewise, all other-directed ultimate desires for the benefit of a person are altruistic 
because another individual is represented as an essential beneficiary.  Furthermore, 
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 Here, briefly, is a defense of the stronger claim:  It may be true that other-directed ultimate desires 
for the benefit of another are in some sense more altruistic than certain relational ultimate desires for 
the benefit of another.  But it is nevertheless true that certain relational ultimate desires are altruistic.  
Here we might want to say that other-directed ultimate desires for the benefit of another are purely 
altruistic, while the corresponding relational desires are not.  So, Liz‘s ultimate desire that she and 
Tracy have a mutually enjoyable game of tennis may not be purely altruistic, but it is nevertheless an 
altruistic one.  Likewise, we can say that Milhouse‘s ultimate desire that he have an enjoyable kiss 
with Lisa is not purely egoistic, but it is nonetheless egoistic. 
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the new conception of psychological egoism accords with Stolen Kiss, in which 
Milhouse ultimately desires that he have an enjoyable kiss with Lisa.  While Lisa and 
Milhouse are both essential constituents of the content of his desire, the essential 
beneficiary represented is only Milhouse.  Similarly, this construal of psychological 
altruism accords with Single Savior in which Nate ultimately desires that  he save 
Brenda.  While both Nate and Brenda are featured in the content of the desire, Nate 
himself is not an essential beneficiary.  
 
4. Psychological Experiments 
 
I hope it is now clear that, contra Sober and Wilson, relationism is neither a sub-
species of psychological egoism nor of psychological altruism.  Relational desires 
should be incorporated into both theses.  But is this problematic for Sober and 
Wilson‘s overall view?  I will now attempt to show that it is by applying this new 
conception of the egoism-altruism debate to one of Sober and Wilson‘s explanations 
of some of the data gathered by psychologists.  Before evaluating their proposal, 
however, we must look at the relevant experiments. 
4.1  An Empirical Approach 
The egoism-altruism debate is largely empirical, but not entirely.  The competing 
positions make empirical claims, since they concern how people are actually 
motivated to benefit others.  However, the claims are about the nature of that 
motivation, which involves more conceptual issues about motivational mental states 
and their contents.  So the issue is subject to both empirical and conceptual 
investigation.  But a problem arises with empirical investigation of the issue:  we do 
not obtain indubitable demonstration of a person‘s ultimate desires by mere 
observation.  If the issue is pursued empirically, experiments must be devised in 
which subjects are put into a situation with the opportunity to help another perceived 
to be in need while certain variables are manipulated to allow experimenters to make 
reasonable inferences about the underlying motivations.  Thus, the empirical 
investigation will involve testing hypotheses, theories, or explanations of data 
obtained from such experiments that either support the thesis of psychological 
egoism or the thesis of psychological altruism.  The goal of providing experimental 
data for the debate, then, only provides confirmation or disconfirmation of 
explanations of data that are either ―egoistic‖ (in the sense of supporting 
psychological egoism) or ―altruistic‖ (in the sense of supporting psychological 
altruism). 
Recognizing these points, social psychologists have designed a number of 
experiments in an attempt to test various versions of psychological egoism and 
altruism.  A key figure in this literature is C. Daniel Batson.  Batson (1991) 
synthesizes the evidence and argues that the experiments provide support for an 
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altruistic theory: the empathy-altruism hypothesis (EAH).
8
  As Batson et al. (1988) 
put it, the hypothesis is that ―empathy evokes motivation directed toward the 
ultimate goal of benefiting the person for whom empathy is felt, not toward some 
subtle form of self-benefit‖ (p. 52).  Batson proposes to substantiate this hypothesis 
by showing that the best explanation of the data is the EAH.  If Batson is correct, this 
provides justification for believing that psychological egoism is false since the EAH 
entails that psychological altruism is true:  people do sometimes have ultimate 
desires for the welfare of others (and this is induced by empathic feelings).   
To reach this conclusion, Batson reviews findings from experiments since 
around the 1960s as well as more recent experiments on the matter, including his 
own.  Around the 60s and 70s, psychologists learned much about the emotion of 
empathy, including how to effectively induce it in subjects.
9
  The term ―empathy‖ 
here may not line up precisely with how the term is ordinarily used.  Batson (1991) 
states that by ―empathy‖ he means ―an other-oriented emotional reaction to seeing 
someone suffer‖ (p. 58) that ―includes feeling sympathetic, compassionate, warm, 
softhearted, tender, and the like‖ (p. 86).  Later, psychologists discovered what 
Batson calls the ―empathy-helping relationship‖ (EHR)—experience of relatively 
high empathy for another perceived to be in need causes people to help that person 
more than relatively low empathy.  But the EHR doesn‘t settle the egoism-altruism 
debate, for the underlying motivation to benefit the other that‘s induced by empathic 
feelings could be either ultimately altruistic or egoistic.  Well aware of this, Batson 
and others have devised experiments to test various egoistic versus altruistic 
explanations of the EHR.   
Given some basic assumptions about how to infer people‘s motives from their 
behavior, psychologists have formed an empirical strategy for addressing the 
egoism-altruism debate.
10
    While there is no doubt that addressing the egoism-
altruism debate experimentally is extremely difficult, the empirical approach 
developed over the past several decades using the EHR as a springboard has proven 
quite fruitful.  By controlling the situations in which people intentionally help or 
offer to help another person (often called ―the needy other‖), one can hypothesize 
about why the subjects ultimately chose to perform that action—what underlying 
ultimate desires and means-end beliefs contributed to motivating the person to help.  
But which variables are manipulated in the experiments depends on which egoistic 
explanation of the data is being tested against the altruistic explanation (i.e. the 
EAH).   
 
                                                 
8
 For a more concise review of the psychological literature and the argument that it poses a threat to 
psychological egoism, see Batson & Shaw (1991). 
9
 There are various methods for inducing empathy.  Two main methods that have been demonstrated 
to be quite effective are:  (a) the Krebs method of describing the needy other as similar to the subject 
(similar background, sex, life experiences, etc.), and (b) the Stotland perspective-taking method of 
instructing the subject to imagine what it is like for the needy other (how the other feels, etc.).  See 
Batson (1991, pp. 92-6) for further discussion. 
10
 For a more detailed discussion of the background assumptions involved here, see Batson (1991, pp. 
64-67), Sober and Wilson (1998, Ch. 6), and Stich, Doris and Roedder (forthcoming). 
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4.2  Testing Egoistic Hypotheses 
Competing with the EAH are three main categories of egoistic explanations of the 
EHR:  (i) aversive-arousal reduction, (ii) empathy-specific punishment, and (iii) 
empathy-specific reward.  Each hypothesis claims that empathic arousal (i.e. 
experience of relatively high empathy) causes people to help only because it induces 
an egoistic ultimate desire; the desire to help the other is solely instrumental to the 
ultimate desire to benefit oneself.  The aversive-arousal reduction hypothesis 
(AARH) states that empathically aroused individuals help because they ultimately 
seek to eliminate their empathic arousal, since it is an experience to which people are 
averse.  The second species of egoistic explanation, the empathy-specific punishment 
hypothesis (ESPH), claims that people help more when they are empathically 
aroused only to avoid negative evaluation from others or themselves.  The third 
species of egoistic explanation, the empathy-specific reward hypothesis (ESRH), 
claims that people help more when they are empathically aroused only to gain 
benefits or rewards, such as praise (from oneself or others) or a boost in mood.   
Each species of egoistic explanation has been tested in multiple experiments 
against the EAH by various psychologists.  Batson argues that the predictions of all 
these competing egoistic hypotheses are not commensurate with the data and so 
concludes:  ―Pending new evidence or a plausible new egoistic explanation for the 
existing evidence, the empathy-altruism hypothesis, however improbable, seems to 
be true.‖ (1991, p. 174).  Several commentators have taken issue with this claim 
regarding a number of the experiments, arguing that egoistic explanations are still in 
the offing.  But here I want to focus on an especially poignant criticism from Sober 
and Wilson.  For our purposes, then, we need only discuss experiments involving the 
ESRH, since the explanation of Sober and Wilson to be discussed is a version of this 
third category of egoistic hypothesis.   
Testing of the ESRH was fairly complex because there are several versions of 
the hypothesis that make different predictions.  However, for our purposes, we need 
only discuss the second version of the ESRH:  the negative-state relief hypothesis 
(NSRH), initially proposed by Robert Cialdini and colleagues.  According to Cialdini 
et al. (1987), the NSRH states that ―an empathic orientation causes individuals 
viewing a suffering victim to feel enhanced sadness‖ and ―these saddened subjects 
help for egoistic reasons:  to relieve the sadness in themselves rather than to relieve 
the victim‘s suffering‖ (p. 750).  The hypothesis predicts, in other words, that the 
ultimate desire of empathically aroused individuals (so-called ―high-empathy 
subjects‖) is to restore themselves to a normal state.  Furthermore, it is assumed that 
subjects believe the negative-state can be relieved by some distinct varieties of 
mood-enhancing experience (such as payment or praise) that are comparable to 
helping the needy other.  Psychologists reasoned that this egoistic hypothesis 
predicts (contrary to its altruistic competitor) that empathically aroused individuals 
will no longer help in higher frequencies if their mood is restored before they are 
given the chance to offer help or if they believe their mood will be enhanced in an 
alternative way if they choose not to help.  The results of the experiments were that 
leading people to believe their mood would be enhanced even if they chose not to 
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help did not affect how often they volunteered to help, which supports the EAH (for 
review, see Batson, 1991, pp. 163-74). 
 
 
5.  Sober and Wilson’s Criticism of Batson 
 
Sober and Wilson argue that a modified version of the NSRH eludes Batson‘s 
purported refutation of psychological egoism.  Recall that the studies conducted on 
the NSRH tested whether leading people to believe they will receive a mood-
enhancing experience if they choose not to help mitigated the frequency of offers to 
help.  The experiments provide evidence that this is not the case:  whether high-
empathy subjects believe their mood will soon be enhanced does not diminish the 
EHR.  In response to the studies, Sober and Wilson claim that it is ―not surprising 
that the pain we experience in empathizing with the suffering of others is not 
completely assuaged by any old pleasant experience…. When we are sad, we usually 
are sad about something in particular…‖ (1998, p. 271).  So, Sober and Wilson agree 
that the NSRH is undermined by the experiments, but only because that hypothesis 
predicts that empathically aroused individuals think that a mood-enhancing 
experience other than helping the needy other will restore them to a normal state.  
According to their modified negative state relief hypothesis, however, ―empathizing 
with a needy other creates a kind of sadness that subjects know [or at least believe] 
cannot be assuaged by any old mood-enhancing experience‖ (2000b, p. 267).  
Largely because they believe Batson‘s experiments do not rule out this sort of 
egoistic hypothesis, Sober and Wilson conclude that ―the psychological literature has 
not established that the egoism hypothesis is false‖ (1998, p. 272).11  However, they 
do not contend that psychological research cannot ever adjudicate the debate 
(although, they do not assert the opposite).  They officially ―take no stand‖ on that 
issue (1998, p. 272).   
In response to Sober and Wilson‘s critique, Batson (2000) insists that this 
egoistic hypothesis is ―of course simply a restatement of the aversive-arousal-
reduction explanation that… has already been laid to rest‖ (p. 210).  Batson here is 
referring to the experiments conducted on whether ease of escape eliminates the 
EHR.  The key difference between the NSRH and the AARH is a minor one having 
to do with the predictions they make regarding such experiments.  The AARH holds 
that empathically aroused individuals ultimately desire to get rid of the aversive 
feeling of empathy.  Most importantly, the view holds that empathizing with 
someone perceived to be suffering is like being in the vicinity of an annoying 
machine—once one leaves the vicinity, the aversive experience subsides.  Thus, the 
AARH makes the disconfirmed prediction that high-empathy subjects will no longer 
                                                 
11
 I qualify with ―largely‖ because Sober and Wilson do have one other major criticism of the 
empirical evidence against psychological egoism.  They argue that the so-called ―empathic joy 
hypothesis‖ (a version of the ESRH) is not ruled out by the experiments conducted on it (1998, p. 
268).  However, I will not address their criticism here.  Interested readers may consult Batson‘s reply 
(2000, p. 210) and their rebuttal (Sober and Wilson, 2000b, p. 266). 
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help in higher frequencies if they believe they can easily exit or escape the situation.  
The NSRH is quite similar but holds that empathic arousal causes subjects to feel an 
enhanced sadness that lingers with them for at least awhile so that they figure they 
will still be sad even if they can no longer directly perceive the needy other.  Thus, it 
doesn‘t predict that easy escape will reduce helping.  Yet Batson doesn‘t provide any 
reasons for thinking Sober and Wilson‘s proposal makes this prediction. 12     
Contra Batson, Sober and Wilson intend their explanation to be a version of 
the NSRH, and there is a way to read it as such.  They‘re proposing something like 
the following.  As a product of feeling higher levels of empathy, individuals are 
especially sad.  Unlike the AARH, the ability to exit the situation will not 
significantly diminish the rate at which such individuals offer to help, for they 
believe that if they simply leave, they will not be restored to a normal state—the 
sadness will linger.  However, the proposal is a modification of the NSRH in holding 
that not just any mood-enhancing experience will satisfy the ultimate desire of the 
participants.  So the data gathered thus far on the NSRH do not disconfirm this 
hypothesis.  And nothing about this modification forces the claim that easy escape 
will mitigate helping, which was not borne out in experiments on the AARH.  Thus, 
Batson‘s response here is deficient.13   
However, Sober and Wilson‘s proposal is not without its problems.  And this is 
revealed once we attempt to cash out the details.  Recall that, in order to explain the 
data, Sober and Wilson‘s proposal hinges on the claim that not just any mood-
enhancing experience will mitigate helping.  But what are the details of the proposal 
that underwrite this claim?  Will the mood-enhancing experiences not satisfy the 
desire because the desire is for something more specific or because subjects believe 
                                                 
12
 Batson is here assuming, as I will, that only one of the types of egoistic hypothesis may be 
employed to explain the relationship between empathy and helping.  At the very least, he is assuming 
that the experiments conducted so far are similar enough in setup that we should expect a single, 
unified explanation—see Batson (2000, p. 210).  This is why Batson thinks Sober and Wilson cannot 
propose an explanation that makes predictions disconfirmed in other experiments, even though they 
were designed to test other egoistic explanations of the EHR against the EAH.  This is an assumption 
behind the entire research method of Batson and his associates.  However, one might worry about, as 
Robert Cialdini (1991) has, Batson‘s ―one-at-a-time pattern of assault on egoistic alternatives‖ (p. 
125).  Even if Batson is right that the EAH is a more plausible explanation of the data than the 
particular egoistic alternative in a particular experiment, the psychological egoist might be more 
pluralistic in her account of what kinds of egoistic motives people have.  Perhaps any one of the many 
egoistic motives posited could be operative in the various experimental settings.  However, since 
Sober and Wilson don‘t express any qualms with this aspect of Batson‘s strategy, and since my aim in 
this paper is only to raise a worry for their view, I needn‘t defend Batson‘s assumption here.  But 
interested readers may want to consult Stich et al. (forthcoming) for a brief discussion of doubts about 
the strength of this sort of objection to Batson. 
13
  The labels ―NSRH‖ and ―AARH‖ don‘t much matter here.  Batson takes Sober and Wilson‘s 
proposal to be a version of the AARH because of the prediction he thinks it makes regarding easy 
escape.  One might concede this but still think the NSRH is itself a version of the AARH because it 
involves an aversive feeling.  But according to the NSRH, empathically aroused people ultimately 
desire to have their mood boosted.  And while negative feelings play a role in bringing about the 
ultimate desire for a boost in mood, a boost in mood is a reward in the somewhat technical sense of a 
personal gain that is often used among psychologists.  But, again, the labels aren‘t important.  To 
rebut Batson‘s reply, one need only show that Sober and Wilson‘s proposal doesn‘t make the 
disconfirmed prediction about easy of escape. 
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it can only be satisfied in a certain way?  The proposal must modify the NSRH in 
order to explain the data.  But it is unclear how exactly Sober and Wilson intend to 
modify it.  There are several options, but all of them seem to fail.   
 
5.1  The First Option:  Modify the Belief 
Sober and Wilson may want to follow the original NSRH and say that empathically 
aroused individuals possess an ultimate desire with the following content:  I am 
restored to a normal state.  Here the strategy is to retain the ultimate desire posited 
by the NSRH, but modify the relevant means-end belief.  Sober and Wilson 
sometimes seem to indicate that their proposal is to be interpreted along such lines.  
For example, they write that high-empathy subjects believe the mood-enhancing 
experience offered to them ―won‘t do a very good job of removing the bad feelings 
they have when they empathize with a needy other‖ (2000b, p. 267).  There are two 
sorts of means-end belief they can be attributing to people here.
14
   
Option 1a:  On this proposal, high-empathy subjects ultimately desire to be 
restored to a normal state and believe that helping is a better means to this than the 
particular mood-enhancing experience offered by the experimenters.  On this 
proposal, the subjects either believe that what they are being offered won‘t work as 
well or that it will but it‘s a more costly option.  Sober and Wilson seem to suggest 
the former when they ask rhetorically:  ―why expect the subject to think that listening 
to music will be a completely satisfactory mood corrective?‖ (1998, p. 271).  Here 
they are referring to the particular mood-enhancing experience Cialdini et al. (1987) 
offered to participants in one of their experiments.  I agree that it‘s questionable 
whether subjects would take this to be a good way of boosting their mood (or at least 
whether it would be a better means than helping).  However, Sober and Wilson fail 
to mention that Batson provided an alternative which it is quite plausible to think 
participants took to be mood-enhancing.   
Batson et al. (1989) told subjects they would watch a short video. Some were 
told it is in a category which previous research has shown to ―cause strong feelings 
of happiness and pleasure‖ while others were told the video is in a category that 
would cause ―moderate feelings of depression and sadness‖ (p. 924).  Furthermore, 
participants were asked to ―give an example of a movie or TV show they had seen 
that might fit into the category to which they had been assigned‖ after which the 
experimenter ―assured them that the material they identified ‗was just the sort of 
thing in [that category]‘‖ (p. 924).  Various checks were done as well which verified 
the effectiveness of this manipulation of anticipated mood-enhancement.  So there is 
no reason to think participants thought either that this method would be ineffective or 
more costly than helping.  Yet the results were still problematic for the NSRH:  
empathically aroused subjects who were led to believe they could have their mood 
                                                 
14
 The relevant belief need only be attributed to empathically aroused people in these situations, not 
all people.  But such a proposal requires holding that empathy induces such a belief.  A more 
plausible proposal, however, is that most people have this belief (when empathically aroused or not), 
but the belief only becomes relevant to people‘s practical reasoning when their empathic arousal 
induces the relevant ultimate desire. 
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boosted in this way (rather than helping) still tended to help.  Besides, the more 
general problem with this option is that it‘s viciously ad hoc in the absence of a 
principled reason to think the particular mood-enhancing experience offered would 
be deemed by subjects to be insufficient or otherwise inferior.   
Option 1b:  Perhaps, then, Sober and Wilson are proposing that empathically 
aroused subjects believe that the only way to satisfy their ultimate desire is to help 
(i.e. no other possible mood-enhancing experience will be sufficient).  The idea is 
that these subjects falsely believe that it is a satisfaction condition of their ultimate 
desire that the other is helped.  While they only ultimately want their mood to be 
boosted, empathically aroused individuals for some reason think this desire can only 
be satisfied by the person getting help.  But attributing such a belief is unwarranted 
when other, more plausible explanations are available.  To better understand this, 
consider an analogy.  Suppose we run an experiment in which participants are put in 
a room with a television and told they can watch whatever they want for an hour.  
Presumably most people in such a situation would have a desire to watch something 
entertaining.  But suppose we told a joke to half of the subjects beforehand and 
tracked (for all subjects) what type of show they chose to watch.  What should we 
say about their mental states if we find that telling the joke has a significant effect on 
watching a comedy?  Should we conclude that the subjects in the joke condition 
maintain the more general desire to watch something entertaining but for some odd 
reason falsely believe that the only sufficient means is to watch a comedy?  Or is it 
more plausible that telling participants a joke induces in them the more specific 
desire to watch a comedy?  Surely the latter is the more reasonable conclusion of the 
two.   
Option 1b is like the first, implausible explanation in our imaginary 
experiment.  It holds that high-empathy subjects merely ultimately desire to have 
their mood boosted (because they‘re sad) and think that the only way to boost their 
mood is by helping.  But if these subjects just ultimately wanted their mood to be 
restored, why wouldn‘t they simply take the less costly option of watching a video 
that they have every reason to believe causes strong feelings of happiness and 
pleasure?   After all, one‘s mood can undoubtedly be boosted in a multitude of ways.  
Most participants would surely recognize this.  Attributing to them a belief to the 
contrary is unwarranted when a better explanation is available (e.g. that they 
ultimately desire that the other is helped).
15
  At the very least, more would need to be 
said (or found in further experiments) to justify Option 1b.  Of course, this option 
would be much more plausible if the idea is that subjects correctly think the needy 
other must be helped in order for their ultimate desire to be satisfied.  But this isn‘t 
Option 1b.  In modifying the ultimate desire, it‘s a version of the next option. 
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 Sober and Wilson‘s alternative proposal cannot be a mere possibility in the sense of merely 
compatible with the data however implausible.  Their egoistic hypothesis must be at least as plausible 
as the altruistic alternative if it is to be taken as a live possibility that diffuses Baton‘s argument.  
Showing that an alternative is not ruled out by the data involves showing more than its mere 
compatibility with the data.  Otherwise, Batson would be wrong simply because an egoistic evil 
demon hypothesis is commensurate with the data. 
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5.2  The Second Option:  Modify the Desire 
So, how can we interpret Sober and Wilson‘s modified NSRH such that it predicts 
that high-empathy subjects‘ ultimate desires cannot be satisfied by any old mood-
enhancing experience?  The most plausible option is to modify the ultimate desire of 
the empathically aroused.   The proposal must be that the ultimate desire is more 
specific than the original NSRH claimed such that the contents of the ultimate 
desires of these individuals connect them specifically with the other‘s plight.  In fact, 
there is evidence that Sober and Wilson have thought of their proposal along such 
lines.  Alejandro Rosas (2002) reports, according to personal communication with 
Sober, that ―what Sober and Wilson are postulating is an egoistic desire for relief 
from the specific sadness that someone else is suffering, where this relief requires, 
necessarily, an improvement in the situation of the person who is the object of 
empathy‖ (p. 105).  On this proposal, the ultimate desires of empathically aroused 
subjects have something like the following, more specific, content:  I am relieved 
from being sad about the suffering of this person by this person being helped.  This, 
unlike the ultimate desire postulated by the original NSRH, makes sense of why the 
satisfaction of the relevant ultimate desires requires the specific mood-enhancing 
experience of the other person being helped.  Now it is explicitly a satisfaction 
condition of the ultimate desire that the other is helped.  Their ultimate desire is not 
simply to be restored to a normal state; it is to be relieved from being sad about this 
person‘s suffering by the other being helped.  After all, we sometimes not only want 
certain things, but want them to be a certain way.  And this seems especially true of 
empathically-motivated helping:  when we empathize with someone, it seems we‘re 
not just sad in general, we‘re sad in particular about this person‘s suffering.16 
But this interpretation of the modified NSRH also has its problems.  As Rosas 
points out, ―under Sober and Wilson‘s ‗egoistic‘ hypothesis, the specific 
propositional object of the sadness in question is the same state of affairs that would 
be the object of an ultimate altruistic concern, namely the welfare, or lack of it, of 
some other person‖ (2002, p. 105).  The implication seems to be that such a 
hypothesis is not really egoistic, given that the ultimate desire will only be satisfied if 
the needy other is helped.  Elaborating on Rosas‘s complaint, one might argue that 
the ultimate desire on Sober and Wilson‘s hypothesis is other-directed, since the 
needy other is part of the content of the ultimate desire.  So construed, then, the 
modified NSRH is a version of psychological altruism.   
Such an objection to Sober and Wilson, however, goes a bit too fast if we are 
only equipped with Sober and Wilson‘s conception of the debate.  On our 
interpretation of their modified NSRH, the ultimate desire attributed to empathically 
aroused individuals is relational.  But Sober and Wilson‘s conception of the debate 
doesn‘t say anything about relational desires and whether they are compatible with 
psychological egoism or altruism.   
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 Note that such a proposal isn‘t committed to the claim that the desire is satisfied only if the subject 
is the one to help, which may conflict with data gathered on other versions of the ESRH.  One can be 
relieved from being sad about the suffering of someone without being the one to help.  Being the one 
to help is simply the preferred means to achieve their end in such situations because they think they 
are the only one available to help. 
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But now, with the inclusion of relational desires into both psychological 
egoism and altruism, we can properly evaluate the modified NSRH of Sober and 
Wilson.  We can now see that the charge that it fails to be an egoistic hypothesis 
poses a substantial threat.  First, recall that to account for all the current data the 
proposal must construe a subject‘s empathically aroused ultimate desire as relational, 
connecting the subject to the needy other and her plight.  On this supposedly egoistic 
explanation, the ultimate desire of high-empathy individuals is to be relieved from 
feeling sad about the suffering of this person by this person being helped.  This 
explains the data by predicting that not just any old mood-enhancing experience can 
satisfy the ultimate desires of the empathically aroused.  However, the question then 
arises:  Can the psychological egoist legitimately help herself to such an explanation 
of the data?  We are now in a position to answer this question in the negative.  Sober 
and Wilson‘s hypothesis is construed in such a way that the needy other is an 
essential beneficiary of the desire:  it is a necessary condition for the satisfaction of 
the desire that the other perceived to be in need is helped.  But then the ultimate 
desire is no longer egoistic.  Indeed, it may even be altruistic (recall Tennis Game).  
And this is the case whether the person represents herself as an essential beneficiary 
or not.  Insofar as someone other than the agent herself is an essential beneficiary in 
the content of the ultimate desire, it ceases to be the kind of desire allowed by 
psychological egoism. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
Two things, I hope, are now clear.  First, relational desires must be incorporated into 
our conception of psychological egoism and altruism, and this can be done by 
making use of the concept of essential beneficiaries.  Second, Sober and Wilson‘s 
modified NSRH is not available for the psychological egoist.  Indeed, our improved 
conception of the debate shows that any explanation of that type attributes a non-
egoistic desire to empathically aroused individuals.  While ultimate relational desires 
can be egoistic (as in Stolen Kiss), relational desires whose contents relate the 
individual to another‘s benefit cannot.  So, while the hypothesis is an explanation of 
the data, it‘s not an egoistic one.   
These two theses I‘ve tried to establish have two immediate consequences that 
I‘d like to mention.  First, this could spell some bad news for Batson.  Batson can 
take comfort in the fact that Sober and Wilson‘s modified NSRH cannot be used to 
support their claim that the empirical evidence against psychological egoism is 
inconclusive.  However, if I am right that Batson intends the EAH to be positing 
ultimate desires that are other-directed, then there is another non-egoistic 
explanation on the table now in competition with Batson‘s EAH.  This competing 
hypothesis is that empathy induces ultimate desires that are relational, rather than 
other-directed.  It could of course be that Batson conceives of the EAH in a way that 
is neutral on whether the ultimate desire is relational or not.  If so, then the truth of 
my theses would pose no problem for Batson‘s hypothesis, so long as such relational 
desires are in fact altruistic.  I think they are, but I need not argue as much here.  In 
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any event, the data gathered so far do not provide enough evidence for us to say 
whether the ultimate desires of empathically aroused individuals are relational or 
other-directed.   
The second consequence is that this does go some way toward defending the 
sort of non-deductive argument against psychological egoism that Batson has 
attempted to provide.  While the data may not favor the standard EAH over a 
modified NSRH (or something similar), one might still argue that psychological 
egoism is false because the data rule out all the plausible hypotheses that are 
properly egoistic.  If this sort of Batsonian argument is sound, then it‘s still 
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